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I. INTRODUCTION
The Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act,' first enacted in
1918,2 generally provides for case benefits 3 and medical care4 to in-
dividuals injured in employment-related accidents. While the Act
is neither tort law nor social insurance, it contains elements of
both. As social legislation, the Act plays an important role in pro-
tecting citizens from loss of wages and provides an important sup-
plement to protection available from the federal Old Age, Sur-
vivors' Disability and Health Insurance Program,5 unemployment
compensation and private health and accident insurance plans.' In
1979, more than 43,000 Virginia employees filed claims under the
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 through 65.1-163 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
2. 1918 Va. Acts, ch. 400 at 637. The Act was based on the Indiana act then in existence.
For this reason, Indiana decisions have often been relied on in construing the Virginia stat-
ute. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cohen's Dep't Store, Inc., 171 Va. 106, 198 S.E. 476 (1938); Hoffer
Bros., Inc. v. Smith, 148 Va. 220, 138 S.E. 474 (1927). Both Virginia and Indiana borrowed
from the English statute in order to avoid constitutional problems. See generally 1 A. LAR-
SON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 5.20 (1978).
3. The Act provides cash benefits for partial and total incapacity as well as limited death
benefits and scheduled compensation for the loss of various bodily parts. Compensation for
loss of earnings, based on average weekly wpge calculations, is provided to a limited degree.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-54 to -82 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
4. Medical attention is provided free of charge to the claimant for as long as necessary.
The term "medical attention" is used comprehensively and includes hospital services, sur-
gery, psychiatric care, specialists, and prosthetic devices as well as reasonable and necessary
vocational rehabilitation. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-85 to -91 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
5. Commonly referred to as Social Security.
6. See generally 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 96. Because of the social policies served by
the Act in protecting employees and their dependents, the Virginia Supreme Court has fre-
quently stated that the Act is to be liberally construed. See, e.g., Honaker & Feeney v.
Hartley, 140 Va. 1, 13, 124 S.E. 220, 223 (1924).
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Act.7 Unlike other social insurance programs, however, workmen's
compensation is funded by neither the employee nor the state. For
a qualifying injury, death or disease, liability is borne by the em-
ployer and, presumably, passed on to the consumer."
Unlike tort law, workmen's compensation is not founded on the
concepts of fault and negligence.9 With but few exceptions,10 these
concepts are not relevant in determining liability. Instead, the pri-
mary issue is whether a work-connected injury arises out of and in
the course of employment.11 Also unlike tort law, compensation is
generally limited to a "disability" which impairs earning capacity.
By statute, there are limitations on the amount of compensation
that can be awarded1 2 and, with certain exceptions, limitations on
7. Telephone conversation with Ronald Umble, Virginia Industrial Commission, in Rich-
mond, Virginia (October 23, 1980).
8. The employer can absorb the loss as a business deduction and pass that loss on to the
consumer. See Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 2, § 3.20.
9. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 2.20. Claimant need not prove negligence or fault on
the part of the employer. Similarly, an employer faced with a workmen's compensation
claim may not raise the common law defenses otherwise available to him in a tort action.
These defenses are often referred to as the "unholy trinity" consisting of the fellow servant
rule, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence. 1 A. LAmsON, supra note 2, § 4.30.
10. Fault on the part of the employee is relevant where the employee's defense is based
on VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-38 (Repl. Vol. 1980) which provides:
No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death:
(1) Due to the employee's willful misconduct, including intentional self-inflicted
injury,
(2) Growing out of his attempt to injure another,
(3) Due to intoxication, or
(4) Due to willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty
required by statute or the willful breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the
employer and approved by the Industrial Commission and brought prior to the
accident to the knowledge of the employee.
The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under
this section.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
12. The weekly compensation for total incapacity is set by statute at 662/3 % of the
claimant's average weekly wage, not to exceed 100% of the average weekly wage of the Com-
monwealth (recomputed each year), nor to be less than 25% of that average. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.1-54 (Repl. Vol. 1980). In 1979, the maximum weekly cash benefit payable was $220.
Manpower Research Division of Virginia Employment Commission, Covered Employment
and Wages, 2nd Quarter 1979 (1980).
In cases of partial incapacity, benefits are limited to 66 2/3 % of the difference between the
average weekly wages prior to the accident and those wages after the accident, not to exceed
100% of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-55 (Repl.
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the duration of benefits.1 3
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the scope
and coverage of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act and
the statutory criteria that must be satisfied before an employment-
related injury or death is found compensable. 14 Because of the con-
sequences flowing from a determination that workmen's compensa-
tion law applies, awareness of the basic parameters of the Act is
important, not only to the practitioner specializing in the field,'
but also to virtually every lawyer and individual concerned with
personal injury cases. For an "employee" 1 injured "by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment," 117 workmen's com-
pensation is the sole and exclusive remedy s available against an"employer." 19 If an injury is covered by the Act, the employer can-
not be sued, even if its negligence caused or contributed to the em-
ployee's injury.20 Not so obviously, a negligent fellow employee of
Vol. 1980). Scheduled compensation for loss of a member is also computed as a percentage
of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth and is limited in duration, depending on
the member lost. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-56 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
13. Compensation benefits for partial or total incapacity are limited to five-hundred
weeks. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-54 to 65.1-64 (Repl. Vol. 1980). However in cases involving a
single accident or injury and resulting in total paralysis, insanity, or the loss of both hands,
feet, arms, legs, eyes, or combination of any two, benefits may be for a specified amount and
an unlimited duration. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-56 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
14. This article is limited to a discussion of "injuries by accident" as that term is defined
by statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980). The equally important area of occupa-
tional diseases is beyond the limited scope of this discussion.
15. Excellent references for the practitioner include: LARSON, supra note 2; JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR AND THE VIRGINIA BAR
ASsocIATION, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR THE EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY AND CLAIMANT'S
ATTORNEY (1980).
16. For purposes of the Act, the term "employee" is defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-4
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
17. For purposes of the Act, the phrase is used as defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
19. For purposes of the Act, the term is used as defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-3 (Repl.
Vol. 1980).
20. An exception to this rule arises if the employer, in contravention of §§ 65.1-104.1, .2, -
105, fails to maintain workmen's compensation insurance or, in the alternative, falls to sat-
isfy state requirements on achieving self-insurer status. In either case, a claimant may main-
tain a negligence action wherein the employer will be precluded from raising certain de-
fenses. The Act provides that-
If such employer refuses and neglects to comply with the provisions of the preceding
section (§ 65.1-105) he shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor
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the injured party is immune from suit as well.21
II. EMPLOYMENT STATUS
The threshold question for determining if the Act applies is
whether the requisite employer-employee relationship exists. The
Act defines "employer" to include:
the State and any municipal corporation therein or any political
subdivision thereof and any individual, firm, association or corpora-
tion, or the receiver or trustee of the same, or the legal representa-
tive of a deceased employer, using the service of another for
pay.... [I]t includes his insurer so far as applicable. 22
The term "employee" is defined to include: "every person, includ-
ing a minor, in the service of another under any contract of hire or
apprenticeship, written or implied. '23 Omitted from coverage by
the Act are employees within the following categories: those em-
ployed in a business having less than three regular employees, cas-
ual employees,2 ' domestic servants, and farm and horticultural la-
borers employed by farmers employing less than four full-time
employees and with an annual payroll of less than $15,000.25
more than one-thousand dollars, and he shall be liable during continuance of such
refusal or neglect to any employee either for compensation under this Act or at law in
a suit instituted by the employee against such employer to recover damages for per-
sonal injury or death by accident, and in any such suit such employer shall not be
permitted to defend upon any of the following grounds:
(1) That the employee was negligent;
(2) That the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow employee; or
(3) That the employee had assumed the risk of the injury.
The fine herein provided may be assessed by the Commission in an open hearing
with the right of review and appeal as in other cases.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-106 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
21. See Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 165 S.E.2d 394 (1969); Phillips v. Brinkley, 194 Va.
62, 72 S.E.2d 339 (1952).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-3 (RepL Vol. 1980).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-4 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
24. VA. COD ANN. § 65.1-28 (Repl. Vol. 1980). The casual employee exclusion found in
this section must be read together with § 65.1-4. An employment cannot be said to be casual
if it is in the usual course of trade, business, occupation, or profession of the employer. See
Hoffer Bros., Inc. v. Smith, 148 Va. 220, 138 S.E. 474 (1927).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-28 (Repl. VoL 1980). All employers excluded by this section,
including farmers, may voluntarily elect to be bound by the Act by notifying their em-
ployees of such intention. Any employee may then reject the Act by so notifying the Indus-
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A. Contract of Hire
While the Act requires that some form of employment contract
exist between the parties in order for the employment relationship
to exist,2" the Act does not specifically define the term "contract of
hire." The Virginia Supreme Court has defined the term as: "an
agreement in which an employee provides labor or personal ser-
vices to an employer for wages or remuneration or other thing of
value supplied by the employer. '27
By statute, this contract may be express or implied.2 If one
party renders services or labor of value to another under circum-
stances which raise a presumption that the parties intended and
understood that such services or labor were to be paid for, or
where a reasonable person in the position of the person receiving
the benefit of the services or labor would know that compensation
of some kind was to be exchanged, then there is held to be a "con-
tract of hire. '29
When services or labor are provided voluntarily, with no express
or implied promise of remuneration or compensation, the provider
of such gratuitous service is excluded from coverage by the Act. In
Charlottesville Music Center, Inc. v. McCray,30 two teen-aged boys
were installing shelving at a music store. The shelves had been
purchased from the father of one of the boys. Another boy, a
friend, came to help and was killed while operating a faulty cargo
hoist belonging to the music store. Despite the fact that the dece-
dent was working at the store with the knowledge, consent, and
approval of the store manager, the court held that he was not an
trial Commission. In the absence of such notification, the employees are presumed to have
elected to be bound by the Act. See Dey v. Logan, 175 Va. 68, 7 S.E.2d 102 (1940). By
taking out a workmen's compensation insurance policy, an employer voluntarily subjects
itself to all provisions of the Act during the period covered by the insurance. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.1-35 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-4 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
27. Charlottesville Music Center, Inc. v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 35, 205 S.E.2d 674, 677
(1974).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-4 (RepI. Vol. 1980).
29. 215 Va. at 35, 205 S.E.2d at 678. It should be noted that VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-47.1
(Repl. Vol. 1980) provides that volunteer fire fighters, volunteer lifesaving and rescue squad
members, and auxiliary and reserve police may be treated as employees provided the gov-
erning body of the political subdivision passes an appropriate resolution.
30. 215 Va. 31, 205 S.E.2d 674 (1974).
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employee because there was no evidence that he expected or re-
ceived any compensation or remuneration. Since the decedent was
a non-employee, the administrator of his estate was allowed to
maintain a suit for wrongful death. A jury verdict in the sum of
$25,500 was granted and affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
A similar problem arises where a bona fide employee retains an-
other person to assist the employee in performing his or her duties.
In such a case, the analysis turns on the consent and knowledge of
the employer. In Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Chalkley,3 1 the court
stated the test as follows: "Whether a person engaged by an em-
ployee to assist him in the performance of the duties of the em-
ployer is also an employee depends upon whether the principal
employer has knowledge of such employment and consents thereto.
This knowledge may be actual, or imputed."3 2 In that case, an
eleven-year-old boy was injured while helping the driver of a bread
delivery truck. Although the practice of employing helpers violated
the employer's posted rules, the drivers often did employ young
boys as helpers on Saturdays and holiday mornings. The employer
knew of this practice and failed to stop it. For this reason, the
court ruled that the boy was an employee of the baking company
and his exclusive remedy was workmen's compensation.
B. Master-Servant Relationship
In order to determine whether the parties stand in the proper
relationship necessary for the Act to apply, one must decide
whether the injured party is an "employee" or "independent con-
tractor." This frequently-litigated question becomes important in
cases involving vicarious liability, unemployment compensation,"
social security, and a myriad of fields" other than workmen's com-
31. 184 Va. 553, 35 S.E.2d 827 (1945).
32. Id. at 563, 35 S.E.2d at 831 (1945).
33. United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179 (1970) (certain captains and crewmen
were determined to be employees under the federal unemployment insurance act); I.R.C. §
3306(i).
34. For example, federal income tax must be withheld from compensation of those per-
sons deemed to be "employees." I.R.C. § 3402(a). While the Internal Revenue Code does
not provide a consistently applicable definition of the term "employee" for purposes of the
withholding requirement (see I.R.C. § 3401(c)), Treasury Regulations provide the following
1980]
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pensation. Since the term "employee" is defined only generally by
statute, the Virginia Supreme Court has applied common law
principles in defining the term. The four factors most frequently
applied by the court are: (1) the authority to select and engage, (2)
the obligation to pay wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the
power to control and direct the servant's actions.3 5
Of these four factors, it is the power to control that is the most
significant. The first three elements are not absolutely essential
but are merely indicia of possible employee status."8 In Baker v.
Nussman,37 the decedent had contracted with a general contractor
to remove walls and debris from a building damaged by fire. The
decedent was paid a flat contract price, furnished his own tools and
labor, and was not controlled as to the manner in which he was to
remove such debris. In light of the general contractor's lack of con-
trol over the decedent, the court found him not to be an employee
of the general contractor.
Because of the control retained by an owner, even a licensed
contractor with a valid building permit may become an employee.
general description of the factors to be considered in determining whether an individual is
an employee or an independent contractor:
Generally the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person for
whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who
performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but
also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an
employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall
be done but how it shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the
employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services are performed; it
is sufficient if he has the right to do so. The right to discharge is also an important
factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors
characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every case, are the fur-
nishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work to the individual who performs
the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of an-
other merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means
and methods for accomplishing the result, he is not an employee.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b), T.D. 7068, 1970-2 C.B. 252.
35. See, e.g., Phillips v. Brinkley, 194 Va. 62, 72 S.E.2d 339 (1952); Coker v. Gunter, 191
Va. 747, 63 S.E.2d 15 (1951); Brown v. Fox, 189 Va. 509, 54 S.E.2d 109 (1949); Crowder v.
Haymaker, 164 Va. 77, 178 S.E. 803 (1935). For a list of commonly accepted tests relevant to
determining whether a person is an employee, see 1C A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 43.10;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
36. Brown v. Fox, 189 Va. 509, 54 S.E.2d 109 (1949).
37. 152 Va. 293, 147 S.E. 246 (1929).
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In Craig v. Doyle,3 8 the residence owners retained total control
over a licensed contractor. They secured workmen's compensation
insurance, deducted taxes from his wages, and were constantly pre-
sent at the site. The work was executed under a contract and
rough estimate based on an hourly rate and under the direct super-
vision of the owner. The court, relying on a Vermont case,3 9 made
the following statement about the employer-employee test:
If under the contract the party for whom work is being done may
prescribe not only what the result shall be, but also may direct the
means and methods by which the other shall do the work, the for-
mer is an employer, and the latter an employee. But if the former
may specify the result only, and the latter may adopt such means
and methods as he chooses to accomplish that result, then the latter
is not an employee, but an independent contractor.40
Under this test, the contractor was held to be an employee and his
family allowed to recover under the Act for his death.
The power-of-control test has broad application, and the court
has been willing to look closely at the realities of a transaction in
determining employer-employee relationships. In one case, 41 the
claimant wished to purchase a truck but had insufficient funds.
The owner of the truck allowed him to use it when he could.
Meanwhile, the claimant used the truck hauling lumber, wheat,
and other items for the owner and at the owner's direction and
convenience. The owner had indicated to claimant that another
person was paid five dollars per thousand feet of lumber hauled,
and this casual statement was the only evidence of any contractual
arrangement. There was no agreement as to a set amount to be
paid for the services, nor any agreement as to any specific amount
of work to be done. The court found that, in reality, the claimant
was an employee of the owner and, as such, was entitled to com-
pensation for the loss of his leg due to an injury received while
loading the truck for the owner. Since the claimant placed himself
completely under the control of the owners and did only what they
38. 179 Va. 526, 19 S.E.2d 675 (1942).
39. Kelley v. Hoosac Lumber Co., 95 Vt. 50, 113 A. 818 (1921).
40. 179 Va. at 531, 19 S.E.2d at 677.
41. Brown v. Fox, 189 Va. 509, 54 S.E.2d 109 (1949).
1980]
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directed him to do, the court found the requisite control necessary
for employee status.
In Phillips v. Brinkley,42 the court again looked beyond mere
surface arrangements. There, a highway department employee was
suing for negligence, contending that the defendant truck driver
was an independent contractor and outside the protection of the
Act. The defendant supplied his own truck to do hauling for the
highway department at two dollars per hour. The state required
him to be present by seven in the morning and to leave at five-
thirty. Upon arrival at the required location, he was told what to
do and where to go. His work included various jobs, such as haul-
ing posts and picking up workmen. Because the state controlled
the time and manner of the defendant's work performance, the
court ruled that he was a fellow employee of claimant and was,
therefore, immune from suit in a negligence action.43 Since the
Workmen's Compensation Act was found to be applicable, it pro-
vided the claimant's exclusive remedy.,"
Conversely, where the power of control is lacking, an individual
is held to be an independent contractor rather than an employee.
In Mims v. McCoy,45 a carpenter was injured when he fell from a
scaffold while remodeling a riverfront cabin. Even though the
owner of the cabin explained exactly what he wanted done, visited
the site every day, and furnished money and supplies, he did not
prescribe working hours or a particular manner for executing the
work. The carpenter was held to be an independent contractor and
not an employee and, thus, not entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits.
A similar result was reached in Crowder v. Haymaker.4' There, a
miner was refused employment by a mine lessee but secured per-
mission to operate a nearby mine. The lessee furnished the miner
42. 194 Va. 62, 72 S.E.2d 339 (1952).
43. For other cases finding employee status, see Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalkley, 184 Va.
553, 35 S.E.2d 827 (1945); Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
45. 219 Va. 616, 249 S.E.2d 817 (1978).
46. 164 Va. 77, 178 S.E. 803 (1935). "The Workmen's Compensation Act does not under-
take to change, as between themselves, the rights of owners and independent contractors.
This statute leaves that relationship as it was at common law and we must look to it in
determining who is master and who is servant." Id. at 79, 178 S.E. at 804.
[Vol. 14:659
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with tools and bought the coal for a certain price per ton as it was
mined. While the lessee visited the mine from time to time, he ex-
ercised no control over the operations thereof. The miner furnished
his own explosives, fuses, and caps and determined the manner in
which these should be used. Thus, he was judged not to be an em-
ployee and held not entitled to compensation for the loss of his eye
in a mine explosion.' 7
C. Loaned Employees
Where an employee is loaned to another employer, the borrow-
ing employer may become liable for workmen's compensation if the
employee is injured while under his direction.4' The issue turns on
the borrowing employer's right to control the employee. If the bor-
rowing employer has the power to control and direct the employee
in the performance of his work, it becomes the special master and
is exclusively liable for injuries incurred by the person while in its
employ.49 This is so even though the general employer continues to
pay wages and retains the power of dismissal. 50 If, however, the
borrowing entity merely agrees that the general employer shall
perform the work through employees of its own choosing and,
thereby, retains direction and control over them, the general em-
ployer remains liable for workmen's compensation.5 1 In such a
case, the borrowing employer may be liable in tort if its negligence
results in injury to the general employer's workman.52
In Coker v. Gunter,"3 the plaintiff was an employee of a pipe-
laying company working under contract with the City of Norfolk.
The driver of a truck removing dirt from the site allegedly failed to
47. For other Virginia cases finding independent contractor status, see Seals v. Tom-V
Mining, Inc., 57 O.I.C. 315 (1977); Hogge v. H. & S. Corp., 53 O.I.C. 139 (1971).
48. The loaned servant doctrine is often raised where an employer seeks to avoid tort
liability by contending that he is a special master and that workmen's compensation is,
therefore, the alleged employee's exclusive remedy. See Tidewater Stevedoring Corp. v. Mc-
Cormick, 189 Va. 158, 52 S.E.2d 61 (1949).
49. However, control requires subordination to the special master. The mere fact that a
loaned employee cooperates with employees of the borrowing employer does not establish
the requisite control. Id.
50. Ideal Steam Laundry v. Williams, 153 Va. 176, 149 S.E. 479 (1929).
51. Id.
52. See notes 48-49 supra.
53. 191 Va. 747, 63 S.E.2d 15 (1951).
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wait for a safe-passage signal and struck the plaintiff. Plaintiff
sought to sue the driver and his trucking company employer. The
problem addressed in the case was whether the driver of the truck
was a loaned servant. If so, the driver, as a fellow employee of the
plaintiff, could not be sued and the plaintiff's sole remedy would
be workmen's compensation.
In determining that the driver was a loaned servant of the plain-
tiff's employer, the pipe company, the Virginia Supreme Court
looked at the actual working relationship and determined that the
driver had been instructed by the trucking company to report to
the site and to do whatever work the pipe company directed. While
on the site, he performed those functions requested of him, includ-
ing hauling dirt, moving items, and flagging traffic. On these facts,
he was held to be a loaned servant despite the fact that the truck-
ing company paid his wages and retained the power to discharge
him. Important to the decision was the fact that the driver was
sent to the site to do the pipe company's bidding, "not only as to
the work to be done, but as to the time and method of doing it.""
The work he was performing was determined to be the work of the
pipe company and not the work of his general employer.
Similarly, in Ideal Steam Laundry v. Williams,"5 the Virginia
Supreme Court held that a person employed by a laundry and re-
quired to work one day a week at a private home doing gardening,
domestic chores, and odd jobs was, at the time of his injury at the
home, the servant of the private homeowner and not the laundry.
Critical to the decision was the fact that the injured party was
then under the control of the homeowner, both as to the work per-
formed and the method of doing it. In reaching the decision that
the injured party had no claim against the laundry, his general em-
ployer, the court found significant the fact that Virginia's compen-
sation act contained no provision that a "general employer shall be
deemed to continue to be the employer of the workman while he is
working for that other person." 50 Since the English workmen's
compensation act, on which the Virginia statute was based, con-
tained such a provision, the court concluded that the omission in-
54. Id. at 755, 63 S.E.2d at 18.
55. 153 Va. 176, 149 S.E. 479 (1929).
56. Id. at 181, 149 S.E. at 481.
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dicated a legislative intent to allow the common law rule of non-liability to apply.57
D. Employees of Independent Contractors
A section of the statute" provides that nothing contained in the
Act "shall be construed to make ... the employees of an indepen-
dent contractor the employees of the person or corporation em-
ploying or contracting with such independent contractor." This
section, however, must be read in conjunction with other sections
of the Act establishing the "statutory employer" concept.5 9 Al-
though a direct employer-employee relationship may not exist, the
employment relationship may be created by statute where certain
conditions are satisfied and the relationship is one of owner to
workmen of subcontractor, to workmen of sub-subcontractor, and
so on.e0 Where statutory employer status is found, the statutory
employer and its insurance carrier are liable for payment of com-
57. Id. at 182, 149 S.E. at 481.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-5 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
59. See generally 1C A. LAR SON, supra note 2, § 49.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-29 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides that:
When any person (in this section and §§ 65.1-31 and 65.1-32 referred to as "owner")
undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or
occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 65.1-31 to
65.1-34 referred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance by or under
such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner,
the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensa-
tion under this Act which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been
immediately employed by him.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-30 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides that:
When any person (in this and the four succeeding sections (§§ 65.1-31 to 65.1-34)
referred to as "contractor") contracts to perform or execute any work for another
person which work or undertaking is not part of the trade, business or occupation of
such other person and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 65.1-31,
65.1-32, 65.1-33, and 65.1-34 referred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or per-
formance by or under the subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work under-
taken by such contractor, then the contractor shall be liable to pay to any workman
employed in the work any compensation under this Act which he would have been
liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-31 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides that:
When the subcontractor in turn contracts with still another person (in this section
and §§ 65.1-32, 65.1-33, and 65.1-34 also referred to as "subcontractor") for the per-
formance or execution by or under such last subcontractor of the whole or any part of
the work undertaken by the first subcontractor, then the liability of the owner or
contractor shall be the same as the liability imposed by the two preceding sections.
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pensation benefits."' This is particularly important when the em-
ployee's immediate employer either does not have enough employ-
ees to come under the Act or is uninsured. 2 Statutory employer
status also has the effect of shielding an employing entity from lia-
bility in tort for negligence toward any covered employee.63 The
issue of statutory employer status turns on whether the subcon-
tracted work, no matter how far down the line, is part of the usual
trade, business or occupation of the alleged statutory employer. In
essence, the question is whether this is the type of work that would
generally be carried out by the statutory employer's employees.6
Two recent cases involving oil companies, Shell Oil Co. v.
Leftwich,e5 and Sun Oil Co. v. Lawrence,6" demonstrate applica-
tion of the usual trade, business, or occupation rule. In Shell Oil,
the oil company owned a service station which it leased to a dealer.
Two of the dealer's employees were struck by a train while on a
service call in the dealer's truck. One was killed and the other seri-
ously injured. The Industrial Commission held that both were stat-
utory employees of Shell and entitled to workmen's compensation
from Shell. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held the issue
to be: "whether the retailing of gasoline to the general public, ad-
mittedly an indispensable activity to the Shell Oil Company, is an
activity normally carried on by Shell through its employees rather
61. The statutory employer is entitled to indemnity from the immediate employer or an
intermediate subcontractor, as provided in the Code:
When the principal contractor is liable to pay compensation under any of the four
preceding sections (§§ 65.1-29 to 65.1-32), he shall be entitled to indemnity from any
person who would have been liable to pay compensation to the workman indepen-
dently of such sections or from an intermediate contractor and shall have a cause of
action therefor.
A principal contractor when sued by a workman of a subcontractor shall have the
right to call in that subcontractor or any intermediate contractor or contractors as
defendant or co-defendant.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-33 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
62. If the immediate employer of the injured person has the required number of employ-
ees and can comply with the award for compensation, the immediate employer and not the
statutory employer will be directed to make the payments. Under §§ 65.1-29 to -31, liability
of persons other than the immediate employer is of a secondary nature only. Possin v.
Eubank, 12 O.I.C. 444 (1930).
63. See Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S.E.2d 469 (1947).
64. Id.
65. 212 Va. 715, 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972).
66. 213 Va. 596, 194 S.E.2d 687 (1973).
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than through independent contractors."67 The court determined
that Shell's control over the gasoline terminated on its delivery to
the dealer, and, therefore, sale to the consumer public was an ac-
tivity which Shell did not normally carry on through its employees.
Because Shell did not operate retail service stations or provide au-
tomotive services through its own employees, it was held that Shell
was not a statutory employer and not liable under the Act.
Similarly in Sun Oil,"' the claimant, an employee of a Sunoco
service station operator, was injured while performing his duties.
At the time of the injury, Sun Oil owned 255 service stations oper-
ated by dealer-lessees such as claimant's employer and operated
four similar stations with its own employees. Since less than two
percent of all Sunoco service stations in Virginia were operated by
Sun Oil employees, the Court held that Sun Oil was not normally
in the business of retailing gasoline and performing automotive
services and was, therefore, not a statutory employer.6,
The statutory employer sections of the Act contain no mention
of the State, its political subdivisions, or municipal corporations.
Consequently, it has been held that these sections are not appli-
cable to such entities, and employees of independent contractors
performing work for these entities cannot seek compensation from
them.70
H. INJURIES BY ACCIDENT
With the exception of certain occupational diseases,7 " the Act
provides compensation only for "injuries by accident."72 In meet-
ing this standard, the claimant must establish that the circum-
67. Shell Oil'Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715, 722, 187 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1972).
68. 213 Va. 596, 194 S.E.2d 687 (1973).
69. Id. at 598, 194 S.E.2d at 688. On the issue of statutory employer status, see also Hipp
v. Sadler Materials Corp., 211 Va. 710, 180 S.E.2d 501 (1971); Burroughs v. Walnont, Inc.,
210 Va. 93, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969).
70. City of Portsmouth v. Daniels, 157 Va. 614, 162 S.E. 324 (1932).
71. See VA. CoD ANN. §§ 65.1-46 to -53 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, "injury" and "personal injury" mean only in-
jury by accident, or occupational disease as hereinafter defined, arising out of and in
the course of the employment and do not include a disease in any form except when
it results naturally and unavoidably from either of the foregoing causes.
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stances of his claim fit the definition of accident, that his injury is
traceable to a particular time and place, and that there is a causal
relationship between the accident or untoward event and the ac-
tual injury.r7
A. Accident: Definition
The Virginia Supreme Court has stated:
The definition of accident generally assented to is an event happen-
ing without any human agency, or, if happening through human
agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and not
expected by the person to whom it happens.
... Where the effect was not the natural and probable conse-
quence of the means employed, and was not intended or designed,
the injury resulting was produced by accidental means. 74
Thus, it is sufficient for purposes of fulfilling the "by accident" re-
quirement that either the cause or the result be unexpected.75 For
example, in Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Hosey," the claimant's
employment involved making a door-to-door survey. While ascend-
ing rock steps in order to conduct such a survey, her knee "caught
and then it just snapped." Even though the claimant was not en-
gaged in any unusual exertion and even though there was nothing
unusual about her duties on the day of the injury, the employee
was allowed to recover.
73. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Quann, 197 Va. 9, 87 S.E.2d 624 (1955).
74. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 570-71, 159 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1968); Derby
v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 342, 49 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1948); Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray, 161
Va. 446, 451-52, 171 S.E. 686, 688 (1933).
75. 1B A. LmAsON, supra note 2, §§ 37.00-38.00. Most states require an injury by accident,
some unexpected mishap, or an untoward event. Larson breaks down the accident concept
into two basic divisions with two sub-parts. The first is unexpectedness, either as to cause or
as to result, and the second is a definite time, either as to cause or as to result. If both parts
of the concept are satisfied, then clearly there has been an accidental injury. When neither
is satisfied, it is equally clear that there has been no accident. Difficulty arises in those cases
that lie somewhere in between. Some jurisdictions, unlike Virginia, require that the cause be
unexpected and hold that the "by accident" requirement is not satisfied merely by an un-
expected result.
76. 208 Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968).
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Similarly in Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray,77 a woman in appar-
ently good health attempted to lift a bundle of.clothes and injured
her back. She testified that something in her back had "snapped in
two." In response to a contention by her employer that there was
no external or violent cause of the injury, the court allowed re-
covery, holding that an accident need only be "a 'mishap,' or 'for-
tuitous' happening-an 'untoward event, which is not expected or
designed.' ",78
B. Establishing Time and Place
The claimant must also establish that he was injured at a partic-
ular time, in a particular place, and by a particular accident.79 In
Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.,80 the plaintiff sought to main-
tain a wrongful death action for her husband's death, allegedly
caused by inhalation of poisonous gases and fumes while working
in the defendant's mine. The court held: if the death had been
caused by inhalation of poisonous gases at a particular time and on
a particular occasion which could be determined with reasonable
certainty, then the event would be "injury by accident" and the
Act would be plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Since under the allega-
tions and pleadings of the case the decedent's death could have
been the result of a gradual exposure rather than a particular inci-
dent, the court allowed plaintiff's action for wrongful death to pro-
ceed, holding that the defendant had failed to establish that the
action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission.81
The Virginia Supreme Court seems most willing to find injury by
accident when a claimant can point to a specific incident as the
cause of injury and can support the assertion by prior consistent
statements and actions. For example, in Dixon v. Norfolk Ship-
77. 161 Va. 446, 171 S.E. 686 (1933).
78. Id. at 457, 171 S.E. at 690.
79. Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 24 S.E.2d 546 (1943).
80. Id.
81. At the time of the original action, occupational diseases were not within the purview
of the Act. A verdict that death was caused by gradual exposure due to the negligence of the
coal company was ultimately affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court. Blue Diamond Coal
Co. v. Aistrop, 183 Va. 23, 31 S.E.2d 297 (1944).
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building & Dry Dock Corp.,82 the claimant was lifting a heavy
work bench when he felt a sharp pain in his side and grabbed his
stomach. Co-workers testified as to his movements and statements
at the time of the injury. Medical evidence established that the
claimant, in fact, had suffered a hernia and had a predisposition
for such an injury. The court found that such predisposition was
not a bar to recovery and held there was a compensable injury by
accident as evidenced by the testimony.
Similarly, in Derby v. Swift & Co.,88 the court based its decision
on a physician's statement and the statement of the claimant's
wife. The employee was lifting a heavy table when he suffered a
hernia and subsequently underwent corrective surgery from which
he developed a pulmonary embolism and died. The physician testi-
fied that a strain caused his hernia, and the wife testified that the
claimant told her the night of the incident that he had injured
himself that day while lifting a table. Compensation was allowed.
C. Proof of Causal Relationship
Once the occurrence of an accident has been established with
sufficient definiteness, a claimant has the burden of establishing a
medically factual causal relationship between his injury and his
employment. Professor Larson has noted that probably the most
common reason for defeated claims is "simply the general in-
adequacy of proof connecting the injury medically with the
employment.""
Where proof of this causal relationship is lacking, compensation
will be denied. For example, in Bailey v. Stonega Coke & Coal
Co.,8 5 an employee, seemingly in good health, dropped dead in the
employer's mine. Medical evidence established that the decedent
had a congenital heart disease causing an enlarged right auricle.
Because there was no causal relationship between the death and
any untoward event or accident, it was held that the disease had
simply run its course and compensation denied.
82. 182 Va. 185, 28 S.E.2d 617 (1943).
83. 188 Va. 336, 49 S.E.2d 417 (1948).
84. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 38.83.
85. 185 Va. 653, 40 S.E.2d 254 (1946).
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The importance of medical testimony in proving causation and
the scrutiny which the court will give to such testimony are made
clear in D. W. Mallory & Co. v. Phillips.8 In that case, the em-
ployee, a truck driver and helper in the employer's coal yard, suf-
fered a fatal heart attack while unloading a railroad coal car on a
cold winter day. A subsequent autopsy determined that the em-
ployee had been suffering from severe hardening of the arteries,
hypertension causing an enlarged heart, and "a continual, on-going
process of myocardial death."87
The Industrial Commission awarded compensation benefits to
the widow and was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court. Even
though the "by accident" requirement of the statute is satisfied by
a showing that an attack is accidental as to result, the court held
that the "arising out of" requirement requires proof of causation.
"The claimant must prove that the work activity caused or con-
tributed to the cause of the heart attack" irrespective of any usual
or unusual exertion.""
Where the employee suffered from a pre-existing heart disease,
the court felt that the causation problem could not be resolved by
common knowledge and experience. Further, the court made it
clear that there is no presumption in favor of compensation for a
heart attack following unusual occupational exertion. Thus, the
court felt it was necessary to look to medical evidence in order to
determine whether the necessary causal connection had been
established.
In Mallory, the widow's medical witness testified that the exis-
tence of a causal relationship depended on whether there was a"sudden exertional stress" not related to the usual work pattern.
This fixed the standard of proof for the case and required a show-
ing of even more than unusual exertion. Since there was no proof
of "sudden exertional stress," compensation was denied.8 9
86. 219 Va. 845, 252 S.E.2d 319 (1979).
87. Id. at 847, 252 S.E.2d at 321.
88. Id. at 848, 252 S.E.2d at 321.
89. Id. at 850, 252 S.E.2d at 323. A substantial minority of jurisdictions require a showing
of unusual exertion before an injury resulting from a heart attack, back injury, or hernia is
compensable. The majority of jurisdictions require only a causal relationship between the
actual exertion and the resultant injury. 1B A. LARsON, supra note 2, §§ 38.00 through 39.00.
The majority rule is followed in Virginia. This rule is more in line with the beneficial pur-
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IV. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF
In order to be compensable, an employee's injury by accident
must arise out of and in the course of employment. 0 The two
phrases are used conjunctively and not synonymously, and both re-
quirements must be satisfied in order to bring the case within the
Act. 1 The phrase "arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of
the injury, and the phrase "in the course of" refers to the time,
place and circumstances of the injury.92
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that to determine whether
an accident "arises out of" the employment it will apply the fol-
lowing definition and test from the Massachusetts case of In re
McNicol:93
[A]n injury arises "out of" the employment, when there is appar-
ent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances,
a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if
the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person famil-
iar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned
by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out of" the employ-
ment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the
employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes
from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally ex-
posed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be
peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must
be incidental to the character of the business and not independent
of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen
or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin
in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from
pose of the Act and more equitable in application since the argument as to what is usual or
unusual is eliminated.
90. VA. CODE AN~r. § 65.1-7 (Repl. VoL 1980) provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, "injury" and "personal injury" mean only in-
jury by accident, or occupational disease as hereinafter defined, arising out of and in
the course of the employment and do not include a disease in any form, except when
it results naturally and unavoidably from either of the foregoing causes.
91. Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 186 S.E.2d 63 (1972); Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va.
329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938).
92. 170 Va. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686.
93. 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
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that source as a rational consequence."
One of the many cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia
has discussed the term "arising out of" is Lucas v. Lucas."5 In that
case, the claimant's decedent was employed to assist the employer
in his cement finishing business. On the day of his death, the em-
ployee left the job site for a personal errand at 11:30 a.m. On his
return at 2:00 p.m., he learned that his employer needed to pick up
some payroll checks in another city. Since the employee was not
qualified to finish the job his employer was engaged in, he volun-
teered to make the trip. The employer agreed and the employee
drove the truck to his home, where he picked up his wife and
nephew, and started on the trip. En route, an accident occurred,
fatally injuring the employee. The court held that, even though the
employee's work day had ended at 11:30 a.m.,9e compensation
should be awarded. While the employee acted voluntarily, the
court held his trip to be obviously for the benefit of the regular
employer. Had the employee not volunteered, the employer would
have had to make the trip himself or release another employee
from a job site to make the trip. Therefore, the court ruled that
the death arose out of the employment.
As to the statutory term "course of employment," the court held
in Conner v. Bragg9 7 that an accident occurs in the "course of em-
ployment" when it takes place within the period of employment, at
a place where the employee may reasonably be expected to be, and
while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or is
doing something which is reasonably incident thereto.
In Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors,98 the Supreme Court of
Virginia took the opportunity to further explain and expand the
concept of "course of employment." In Graybeal, the claimant was
a Commonwealth's Attorney who was injured at his home by a
94. Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 208-09, 123 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1962).
95. 212 Va. 561, 186 S.E.2d 63 (1972).
96. Whether or not the injury occurred outside working hours is immaterial so long as it
arose "out of and in the course of employment." Ferrell v. Beddow, 203 Va. 472, 125 S.E.2d
196 (1962) (carpenter, injured while unloading tools from the trunk of his car prior to begin-
ning the workday, was held covered by Act).
97. 203 Va. 204, 123 S.E.2d 393 (1962).
98. 216 Va. 77, 216 S.E.2d 52 (1975).
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bomb explosion. The bomb was placed on his automobile, allegedly
by an individual he had successfully prosecuted for murder. The
individual's conviction resulted in a five year prison term and he
openly vowed revenge.
Were the court to have felt bound by the literal language of the
Conner test set forth above, the claimant's case may have failed,
since the injury did not necessarily occur within the time and
space of employment while he was fulfilling the duties of employ-
ment. Rather than reject the claim however, the court chose to dis-
tinguish Conner and to "recognize the realities of the claimant's
employment situation."9 The court determined that the course of
events leading to the claimant's injury was unbroken, beginning
with the prosecution, continuing through the desire for revenge
and ending with the bombing. This, the court held, constituted a
single work-connected incident and was, thus, "in the course of"
employment.100
The dual concepts of "arising out of" and "in the course of" em-
ployment are applied in diverse factual settings. The remainder of
this article will discuss the more prevalent settings for application
of these tests.
A. Going To and Coming From Work
As a general rule, an employee going to or from his place of em-
ployment is not engaged in any employment-related service and is
not within the coverage of the Act for injuries incurred during such
times.101 Exceptions to this general rule include situations where:
(1) the means of transportation is provided by the employer, or
travel time is paid for or included in wages; (2) the route used is
the sole and exclusive method of ingress and egress; or (3) the em-
ployee is still charged with a duty connected with employment
when injured.
These exceptions were discussed in Le White Construction Co.
99. Id. at 79, 216 S.E.2d at 54.
100. A person seeking to limit Graybeal to its facts might point out that a Common-
wealth's Attorney is a public officer whose duties require him to work at various hours and
at various places, including his home.
101. Kent v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 143 Va. 62, 129 S.E. 330 (1925).
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v. Dunn.10 2 There, an employee was killed in a traffic accident
while returning home from a job site in another state in his em-
ployer's truck. Usually the employer required its employees to
travel to and from job sites by their own means of transportation
and at their own expense; it was not customary for them to ride in
the employer's truck.'03 During the week of his death, the decedent
had paid to ride to the North Carolina job site in another em-
ployee's car. At the end of the work week the employer ordered the
driver to drive a company truck back to the home office in Rich-
mond. The decedent, along with another employee, elected to ride
back to Richmond in the truck. The employer did not object. Al-
though the truck had to be unloaded after arrival, it was not estab-
lished that the decedent had been instructed to assist in this work.
On these facts, the court concluded that the free transportation
furnished to the employee was not an express or implied part of
his employment contract and was not beneficial to the employer;
thus, the employee's death was not covered by the Act.10'4
While technically not part of actual work, some activities at or
near the place of employment preparatory to beginning or ending a
work day are within the scope of the Act and are not automatically
barred by the coming-and-going rule. For example, in Brown v.
Reed,105 an employee was struck and injured by a fellow em-
ployee's automobile while walking across the employer's parking
lot on his way to begin work. The injured employee had parked in
the lot, gone to the employer's locker room to change clothes, and
started back across the parking lot en route to the machine shop to
punch the time clock and begin his work day. The driver had just
completed his work shift and was backing out of his parking space.
The court held that the accident occurred at a place where both
102. 211 Va. 279, 176 S.E.2d 809 (1970).
103. If it had been the custom to ride back in the employer's truck, the case for coverage
would have been much stronger. See Bristow v. Cross, 210 Va. 718, 173 S.E.2d 815 (1970)
(customary practice of providing employees rides to work held to benefit employer by insur-
ing their presence on the job).
104. Le White demonstrates that it is not always the employee who seeks to establish
application of the Act. Here the employer appealed the Commission's determination that
the employee's death could not be traced to his employment. No doubt this was to avoid
possible tort liability since the driver's blood alcohol count was 0.24%. 211 Va. at 283, 176
S.E.2d at 813.
105. 209 Va. 562, 165 S.E.2d 394 (1969).
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the driver and injured party were expected to be and both were
doing exactly what their employer had anticipated. Both had used
the locker room and parking lot which were fringe benefits valu-
able to both employer and employee. In these circumstances, the
court held that the injury "arose out of and in the course of em-
ployment," and the injured employee's exclusive rights and reme-
dies were those provided by the Act. Consequently, -the trial court's
dismissal of the injured employee's action against his fellow em-
ployee, the driver of the vehicle, was sustained.106
B. Employees Injured While Residing on the Premises
Where a resident employee is injured on the employer's prem-
ises, the rule in Virginia is that:
Employees required to live on the employment premises are entitled
to be compensated for injuries received on the employment premises
when the employee is continuously on call, or when the source of the
injury was a risk distinctly associated with the conditions under
which the employee lived because of the requirement of living on
the premises. 10 7
For example, in Royster v. Madiera School,108 the claimant was a
housemother residing at a girls' school. She was injured in her
room which she also used as an office so as to be continuously
available to students. Relying on extensive case authority from
106. In contrast is the decision in Fouts v. Anderson, 219 Va. 666, 250 S.E.2d 746 (1979).
There the plaintiff had completed his workday, departed from the company parking lot and
shortly thereafter returned to the parking lot where he was struck by defendant's automo-
bile. Since the plaintiff's return to.the parking lot was for personal reasons rather than for
work-related reasons, it was held that injuries sustained in the accident did not arise out of
and in the course of his employment. Consequently, plaintiff was allowed to maintain his
personal injury suit against defendant, a fellow employee. For other cases demonstrating
exceptions to the going-and-coming rule, see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S.
418 (1923) (claimant had no choice in selecting route to work); Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309,
130 S.E.2d 582 (1963) (transportation furnished by employer); Hann v. Times Dispatch, 166
Va. 102, 184 S.E. 183 (1936); Tyrell v. City Bank & Trust, 51 O.I.C. 279 (1969) (route was
sole means of egress and ingress); Mitchell v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 37 O.I.C. 267 (1955)
(employer constructed route used).
107. Royster v. Madiera School, 36 O.I.C. 290, 294 (1954).
108. Id. See also Moore v. Southern Seminary Junior College, 46 O.I.C. 168 (1964) (com-
pensation allowed for injury received by resident housemother who was readying school
building one month before beginning of school term).
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other jurisdictions, the Commission allowed compensation.
Establishing that the employee is required by the employer to
live on the premises is very important to a claim of this nature. In
McCollum v. Virginia Home for Incurables,109 compensation was
denied to a nurse injured in her room on the employer's premises
because the decision to live on the premises had been optional on
her part, and she had failed to show a lack of a reasonable alterna-
tive to living there.
C. Employees Injured by Hazards of the Street or Highway
While in the Course of Employment
Since 1925, the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that
there are classes of people, such as sales personnel, truck drivers,
and messengers, whose jobs require them to be on the streets and
that they frequently ought to be compensated for accidental inju-
ries which may occur while they are performing these jobs.110
Where an employee is injured because of the hazards of the street
or highway, the court applies what is called the actual risk test.""1
109. 46 O.I.C. 148 (1964).
110. Dreyfus & Co. v. Meade, 142 Va. 567, 129 S.E. 336 (1925).
111. Id. See generally I A. Lm=SON, supra note 2, § 6.00. In progressive order, the five
doctrines for interpreting "arising out of" are the proximate cause, peculiar risk, increased
risk, actual risk, and positional risk. For the injury to be compensable proximate cause re-
quires that the accident be foreseeable and the causal chain have no intervening causes. It is
best represented by the old Massachusetts rule of In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E.
379 (1916) wherein the court required claimant to show that her employment was the proxi-
mate cause of her heart attack.
Under the peculiar risk doctrine, the injured employee must establish that the risk which
caused the injury was peculiar to his employment; that is, not a risk to which the general
public was also subjected. Thus, when a laborer suffered from a frostbitten foot, the court
denied compensation since this was a risk to which any ordinary person working outside in
the cold would be exposed. Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935).
The increased risk test depends on an increased degree of exposure to a certain risk as
opposed to what that risk may have been, almost as a matter of quantity over quality. For
example, where an employee's job required him to be exposed on top of a hill, in wet
clothes, next to electrical wiring, it increased the risk of being struck by lightning. Bauer's
Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943).
The actual risk test restricts the question to whether or not the risk is, in fact, a risk of
that employment. If being struck by an automobile while carrying papers home for grading
is an actual risk of teaching, then it is compensable. Inglish v. Indus. Comm., 125 Ohio 494,
182 N.E. 31 (1932).
The most progressive and all encompassing test is the positional risk doctrine. It employs
the "but for" rationale of causation. A salesman killed while getting in his car to call on
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In describing the test, the court stated: "The test, however, is not
that other persons are exposed to similar risks, but rather that the
employment exposes the workman to the particular danger in the
streets." '112 Thus, the court has held that if an employee's duties
require him to be on the street, he is covered from the hazards
incident to such travel. This coverage applies even though the em-
ployee may have volunteered for the journey, so long as the trip is
in the employer's interest.113
Such a test was applied in Cohen v. Cohen's Dep't Store, Inc.,
where compensation was awarded to a store employee who tripped
on a curb after being called out to the sidewalk by a customer.11
Even though all people on the street are exposed to the risk of
tripping on a curb, the court held: if a job required an employee to
be on the sidewalk because of "some direct or indirect business
mission connected therewith, or if he is upon the sidewalk for some
incidental purpose indirectly connected with his employment and
is injured," the injury is compensable.11 5
Similarly, in Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan,116 the court awarded
compensation to a claimant injured in a car accident while on his
way to a follow-up medical examination for a compensable injury.
The court specifically rejected the employer's contention that the
claimant had to show that the employment placed him on the
highway and that he was thereby exposed to a greater hazard than
the general public. This, stated the court, would be inconsistent
with the court's application of the actual risk test in street cases.117
In the recent case of Baggett Transportation Co. v. Dillon,"8 the
court appears to have cut back the scope of its actual risk doctrine.
customers would not have been there but for his employment, and, hence, the injury is
compensable. Corken v. Corken Steel Prod., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
112. 142 Va. at 574, 129 S.E.2d at 338. Accord, Norfolk & Wash. Steamboat Co. v. Hol-
laday, 174 Va. 152, 5 S.E.2d 486 (1939).
113. Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 186 S.E.2d 63 (1972).
114. 171 Va. 106, 198 S.E. 476 (1938).
115. Id. at 109, 198 S.E. at 477.
116. 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967).
117. Id. at 725, 152 S.E.2d at 257.
118. 219 Va. 633, 248 S.E.2d 819 (1978). The court also failed to recognize the presump-
tion sometimes applied in unexplained death cases. See the discussion in Section M, infra,
for a fuller treatment of this case.
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In that case, a truck driver was found dead next to his truck
parked near the exit ramp of a closed rest area along an interstate
highway. Apparently, while adding oil to the truck's engine, the
driver was struck and killed by a .22 caliber bullet. Evidence ad-
mitted into the record showed that five years earlier a .22 caliber
bullet had been fired into the rest area. Also, on the weekend the
driver was killed, another .22 caliber bullet had been fired into a
building in the same rest area. While police suspected that the
assailant was an area resident hunting in a nearby field, they did
not have sufficient evidence to make an arrest.
In denyfng compensation, the court noted that there was no evi-
dence the driver's death was related to his work. The evidence
showed that the truck and its cargo had not been tampered with
and, thus, the court dismissed any suggestion that death arose
from a hijacking attempt. The prior random shootings in the area
were held to "negate a work-related cause" because:
[T]he risk was not peculiar to the work. We cannot say that Dillon's
occupation as a truck driver subjected him, to an abnormal degree,
to being shot accidentally or intentionally alongside a public high-
way. Such a danger is one to which members of the general public
who are not truck drivers are likewise exposed. 1 9
Discussing the fact that the injury occurred along a public high-
way, the court stated:
[T]he fact that the accident happens along a public highway, and
that the danger is one to which the general public is likewise ex-
posed, is not conclusive against the existence of such causal relation-
ship, unless the danger be one to which the employee, by reason of
and in connection with his employment, is not subjected peculiarly
or to an abnormal degree.120
Since the danger was one to which other members of the public
were likewise exposed, the court felt that this limitation was not
119. Id. at 644, 248 S.E.2d at 825.
120. Id. at 638, 248 S.E.2d at 822 (emphasis added). For this distinction, the court relied
on a case decided before Virginia adopted the actual risk test, Honaker v. Hartley, 140 Va.
1, 124 S.E. 220 (1924).
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satisfied. "Such a result could have occurred whether [claimant]
was a hitchhiker, a stranded motorist, or a truck driver. 121
On its face, the court's apparent requirement that the danger be
one to which the employee be "subjected peculiarly or to an abnor-
mal degree" seems inconsistent with the holding in Cohen where
tripping over a curb was a covered "street risk" or the holding in
Immer allowing recovery by an employee injured while driving to a
work-related medical appointment.122 In part, the court denied
coverage because it was unwilling to adopt the positional risk test
as the law in Virginia and felt that to allow compensation would be
to take such a position.1  However, whether a decision granting
compensation would have required taking such a position is not
altogether clear.124
Rather than viewing the case as a rejection of the actual risk test
previously applied, however, it may be appropriate to view it as a
limitation on what constitutes a street risk case. In awarding com-
pensation in Immer, the court said: "The hazards of highway
travel thus became necessary incidents of his employment.11 25
121. 219 Va. 633, 644, 248 S.E.2d 819, 825 (1978).
122. See also Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 186 S.E.2d 63 (1972); Eaddy v. Southeastern
Tidewater Oppportunity Proj., 56 O.I.C. 100 (1975) (social worker injured in car accident).
123. In Baggett, the court clearly rejected the positional risk test. 219 Va. at 640, 248
S.E.2d at 823 (1978). Prior to this decision, there had been room to argue that the Cohen
and Immer decisions indicated a move toward a positional risk view. See Broughman v.
Fiber Salvage Co., 51 O.I.C. 26 (1969). In his dissent, Commissioner Evans asserts that the
court had adopted the positional risk test in Cohen and Immer.
124. For example, in Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957), an employee
was shot on the employer's premises at the end of the work day. The bullet that struck him
was fired by a teenager target-shooting nearby. The court, speaking in terms of the actual
risk test, found that the employment brought the employee within the actual risk of being
struck by that bullet and allowed recovery.
On the other hand, as Professor Larson states when speaking of hazards such as stray
bullets for which compensation has been granted:
It will be observed that most of the hazards to which the street-risk category has thus
been extended are "neutral" sources of harm. While in most cases the award has been
nominally based on an extension of the street-risk classification, it is possible to argue
that the end product of this extension process will be a realization that the posi-
tional-risk principle is really behind these holdings.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 9.50 (1978). Professor Larson goes on to point out by footnote
that: "If a court suspects this, and at the same time is determined not to accept the posi-
tional-risk doctrine in any guise, the result may well be a denial of compensation." Id., n.58.
125. 207 Va. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 259 (1967). Of course, it could be argued that a truck
driver, by the fact that his job keeps him on and beside the highway to a far greater extent
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Likewise the Baggett decision may be read to say that compensa-
tion was denied because the stray bullet encountered there was not
one of the "hazards of highway travel."
D. Employees Injured While Attending to Personal Needs
Employees injured at work while attending to purely personal
needs have generally been compensated despite the personal na-
ture of the activity. In Bradshaw v. Aronovitch,128 an employee
climbed out onto the back of a moving delivery truck to get a soft
drink in spite of the driver's warning to wait until the next stop.
After disregarding this advice, the employee fell to his death. The
court held that acts of personal comfort and convenience contrib-
ute to the furtherance of work and are, therefore, incidental to
work and ultimately contribute to the benefit of the employer.
Noting that the employer had previously allowed employees to
take drinks from the truck when they were thirsty and that the
decedent's disregard of the driver's warning was not sufficient to
place the decedent outside the scope of his employment, the court
awarded compensation.
In a subsequent wrongful death case, Ravan Red Ash Coal Co. v.
Griffith,1 27 the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to
this personal needs doctrine by stating:
It is well settled that where an employee stops work for a short
while to satisfy his physical needs-such as to take a drink of water
or to go to a near-by toilet on the premises of the employer,-he is
still in the master's employment and is entitled to all of the benefits
of the Workmen's Compensation Act.1 28
Injuries sustained while fulfilling personal needs during lunch
and approved work breaks may also be compensable if the em-
than members of the general public, is exposed to the risk of gunfire in rural hunting areas
to a far greater degree than are members of the general public. Truck drivers were expressly
stated to be in the category of persons the court sought to protect when it first adopted the
actual risk test in street cases. See Dreyfus & Co. v. Meade, 142 Va. 567, 576, 129 S.E.2d
336, 338 (1925).
126. 170 Va. 329, 196 S.E. 684 (1938).
127. 181 Va. 911, 27 S.E.2d 360 (1943).
128. Id. at 922, 27 S.E.2d at 365.
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ployer is ultimately benefited. For example, in Jenkins v. Marval
Poultry Co.,129 an employee received compensation for injuries in-
curred while crossing the street to a company-operated cafeteria
for an approved work break.180 Even the activity of smoking has
been recognized to be important to a claimant's personal needs,
and compensation has been awarded to some employees injured
while smoking at work.131
E. Employees Injured While Engaging in Social and Recrea-
tional Activities
The rule pertaining to injuries received while involved in recrea-
tional activities on the employer's premises was stated by the In-
dustrial Commission in Shaffer v. Stephens:3 2 "Recreational activ-
ities on the premises at a time closely related to working hours and
involving some concurrent benefit to the employer are incidents of
the employment, and injuries while engaged therein arise out of
and in the course of employment." In that case, a resort's summer
employee was injured while using the swimming pool. The claim-
ant recovered for his injuries because use of such facilities served
as an inducement to attract summer help. Also, he was still on call
at the time of his injury, and he was using the pool at a time when
he was entitled to do so.
The most important aspect of analysis in this area seems to be
the benefit derived by the employer and not whether the accident
happened on the premises. For example, compensation has been
allowed by the Commission for an injury received in an off-prem-
ises baseball game by an employee excused from work to play in
129. 57 O.I.C. 192 (1977). See also Giddens v. Van Kesteren, 57 O.I.C. 131 (1976) (com-
pensation allowed for accident on employer's premises during lunch or dinner break); Wash-
ington v. Glisson Masonry Corp., 49 O.I.C. 329 (1967).
130. However, compensation will be denied if it is shown that the claimant abandoned his
employment prior to his injury. In one case, compensation was denied to a workman who
claimed he was injured while going to pick up mining parts for his employer. However, the
Commission found evidence that the employee had been drinking and had left work with no
contemplation of returning to work-related activities. Fleming v. F & F Coal Co., 53 O.I.C.
95 (1971).
131. See Price v. Miller, 51 O.I.C. 221 (1969) (glove caught fire when claimant lit his
cigarette); Young v. Manpower, Inc., 50 O.I.C. 355 (1968) (claimant injured while searching
for cigarette).
132. 36 O.I.C. 425, 426 (1954).
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the game. Although the teams were organized by employees them-
selves, their uniforms were purchased by the employer's supplier
and the company name displayed on the uniforms.1 13
Similarly, an employee's ability to obtain compensation for an
injury received while going to or returning from a social function
away from the employer's premises will depend on whether the
employee's attendance is so work-related as to constitute a special
errand for the employer. This position was taken by the Industrial
Commission in Rogers v. Beneficial Finance Co.,134 where the
claimant was injured on his way home from a company-sponsored
awards dinner. Although there was no evidence that employees
were specifically told to attend the dinner, it was clear that they
were expected to attend. Thus, the Commission found the dinner
to be work-related and held that there was a connection between
the employment and the motivation to attend the dinner.
[A]ttendance at the dinner party was tantamount to a special errand
or special service and the journey from claimant's home to the din-
ner party and the return trip to his home, necessary in order to at-
tend the function, was itself a part of the service or special errand
and, therefore, is compensable. 35
The Virginia rule is in accord with the position advocated by Pro-
fessor Larson. "If the activity, although not an integral part of the
job, is in effect required, it is clear enough that the employer has
brought the activity within the employment. '" 1 3 6
F. Employees Injured by Fellow Workers' Acts of Play
Injuries received as a result of horseplay at the workplace gener-
133. Watson v. Giant Open Air Market, 55 O.I.C. 368 (1972). It should be noted that the
morale of employees, standing alone, has been held not to constitute sufficient benefit to the
employer to warrant imposing workmen's compensation liability:
If indeed the employer received any benefit from the activity, it would be in the
area of morale, which in our opinion is a passive benefit which could not be relied
upon by the employer, since the employer exercised no control over who attended,
who did not attend, or the conditions of attendance.
Andrews v. Schoolfield Bank & Trust Co., 55 O.I.C. 9, 10-11 (1973).
134. 52 O.LC. 216 (1970).
135. Id. at 218.
136. 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 22.22 (1979).
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ally fall within one of two categories. The first consists of injuries
sustained by a person actively participating in the horseplay. The
second consists of injuries sustained by a person not a participant
in the horseplay. In Virginia, as in most jurisdictions, injuries in
the second category are compensable while those in the first cate-
gory are not.137
In Henry v. Henry, 38 several employees were on the roof of a
house repairing a chimney. During a break, they began spraying
each other with soft drinks and one fell to his death. The Commis-
sion held that the death did not arise from the employment even
though it occurred during normal working hours. This holding de-
nying compensation appears to be based in part on the theory that,
by engaging in this activity, the employee had abandoned his em-
ployment. As stated by the Commission, "[t]he injuries arose from
a voluntary act on the part of the deceased which was wholly un-
necessary to his employment and was not in the advancement of
the interest of the employer." 1319 Using the same theory, the Com-
mission has denied compensation for an arm injury caused by "In-
dian wrestling." Again, the Commission held that such activity was
voluntary and not in the interests of the employer. 140
The Commission earlier made its position clear in Srickner v.
Appalachian Wood Preservers.14 There, as a result of an em-
ployee being injured, the employer advised all plant employees
that any further horseplay would result in dismissal. In spite of
this directive, the claimant climbed a wall for the purpose of play-
ing a practical joke. He fell and was injured. The Commission
found: "The abandonment of the employment was extensive and
complete, and must be treated in the same manner as an abandon-
ment of the employment for any other personal purpose .... ,,42
In another case where an employer had given orders to cease
horseplay prior to the claimant's injury, the Commission denied
compensation solely on the general rule that such injuries are not
137. See generally 1A A. LASoN, supra note 2, §§ 23.00-.66.
138. 41 O.I.C. 74 (1959).
139. Id. at 75.
140. Spitzer v. Intervestor's, Inc., 54 O.I.C. 354 (1972).
141. 35 0.I.C. 38 (1969).
142. Id. at 80.
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compensable. Again, the claimant was a participant and instigator
in the horseplay.143
When the claimant is not a participant in the activity, the Vir-
ginia position is that resulting injuries are compensable. In one
case, a fellow employee struck the claimant on his side. Although
there was no intent to injure the employee, serious injury resulted.
The Commission found that the claimant was not a participant
and that, even though the injury occurred in the spirit of play, it
was accidental and compensable. 144 Similarly, compensation was
awarded to a gas station attendant injured when a customer drove
a car into him. The Commission found it was done in horseplay
and that the claimant neither encouraged nor participated in it.1 45
There is one major exception to the rule that the instigator or
participant in acts of horseplay may not recover. If it can be shown
that horseplay had become an incident of the employment which
the employer was aware of or acquiesced in, resulting injuries are
compensable. In Henry the Commission stated: "If it were shown
that the custom of engaging in horseplay was known to or indulged
by the employer we might find an acquiescence on which to bottom
an award.1U4 6
G. Employees Injured by Tortious Conduct by Third Parties
When an employee is injured during the course of his employ-
ment from an assault or battery by a third party, the issue is
whether such assault or battery arises out of the employment. For
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, both assault 47 and
murder1 .48 have been held to be accidental in nature. In order for a
claimant to be compensated, he must show that the assault or
battery was directed towards him because of the employment or
because he was an employee. Since the burden of proof is on the
claimant, his case will fail if it is just as probable that the assault
or battery resulted from a cause not arising out of the
143. Carr v. Sterling Development Corp., 51 O.I.C. 38 (1969).
144. Miller v. Burger King, 52 O.LC. 175 (1970).
145. Flournoy v. East Coast Oil Corp., 54 O.I.C. 125 (1972).
146. 41 O.I.C. 74, 75 (1959).
147. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 755, 172 S.E. 264 (1934).
148. Hopson v. Hungerford Coal Co., 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948).
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employment. 14 9
In one case, 150 the Commission denied compensation to a claim-
ant who was severely injured by unknown assailants who fired on
the claimant and a companion with a shotgun and a .38 caliber
pistol. The claimant had just parked his car in front of a private
residence where he had gone to recover goods previously stolen
from his employer. The Commission held that the employee had
failed to show a relationship between the assault and the employ-
ment, since both assailants and the purpose of the assault were
unknown.
Compensation will be allowed, however, when the claimant can
establish an appropriate causal relationship. 51 As in many other
areas of workmen's compensation law, recovery hinges on the
strength of the claimant's evidence. For example, in Cunningham
v. Commonwealth,1 52 a district court judge was slain by an insane
man. The Commission held that the slaying arose out of the em-
ployment on the basis of evidence showing premeditated murder.
The judge had convicted his slayer of speeding a month prior to
the shooting. ' Similarly, as discussed previously,'" the Virginia
Supreme Court awarded compensation in Graybeal v. Board of
Supervisors155 to a Commonwealth's Attorney who was injured by
a bomb placed on his automobile, allegedly by a parolee whom
Graybeal had successfully prosecuted years earlier.
149. Id. at 306, 46 S.E.2d at 395.
150. Freeman v. Standard Furniture Co., 57 O.I.C. 125 (1976).
151. Even mental problems resulting from an assault are sometimes compensable. A 52-
year-old woman developed nervous disorders because of a holdup in the motel where she
worked. The medical evidence showed she would be unable to return to work anywhere that
a robbery might occur. Huzzey v. Merrimac Motel Corp., 55 O.I.C. 187 (1973). See Willier v.
Arlington Trust Co., 55 O.I.C. 379 (1973) (traumatic neurosis brought on by head injury
received during bank robbery).
152. 57 O.I.C. 92 (1976).
153. See also Walters v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 56 O.I.C. 324 (1975) (store manager shot
and killed by three men whom he had earlier told to be quiet while in store); Alexander v.
Frederick Place Apartments Management, 56 O.I.C. 4 (1974) (groundskeeper assaulted after
apprehending a youth who was vandalizing cars); Perkins v. East End Cab Co., 55 O.I.C. 275
(1973) (cab driver shot while defending himself against a robber).
154. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
155. 216 Va. 77, 216 S.E.2d 52 (1975).
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H. Employees Injured Through Aggravation or Acceleration of a
Pre-Existing Condition
If, in the course of his employment, a person suffers an accident
which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition personal to
that employee, Virginia has long held that the resulting injury
arises out of the employment and is compensable. As stated in
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Money:156
As ageneral rule, the pre-existing physical condition is immaterial if
the injury is proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment. The fact that the accident of itself
would not have been sufficient to cause the injury in the absence of
a pre-existing disease is no defense, for the employer takes the em-
ployee as he finds him, and if the accident accelerates or aggravates
a pre-existing diseased condition, the injured party is entitled to
compensation, while on the other hand an injury to the natural pro-
gress of the disease itself will not warrant a finding that the injuries
were due to an accident.1 57
In Lilly v. Shenandoah's Pride Dairy,15 the decedent, a milk-
man, suffering from a heart condition which may have been con-
genital, suffered a heart attack while lifting and unloading cases
from his delivery truck. This precipitated a second and fatal heart
attack more than nine months later. The court, after determining
that death was caused by an accident covered by the statute, ap-
plied the Liberty Mutual test described above and awarded death
benefits to the employee's dependents.
The compensability of these types of claims very often turns on
the persuasiveness of the claimant's medical evidence. "Whether
156. 174 Va. 50, 4 S.E.2d 739 (1939).
157. Id. at 55-56, 4 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting 1 ScHEnIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
952 (1941)). Similarly, in Rogers v. Williams, 196 Va. 39, 42, 82 S.E.2d 601, 602-03 (1954)
the court, quoting Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 6-7, 2 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1939),
stated:
When it is established that an accident to an employee activates an undeveloped and
dangerous physical condition with mortal consequences, such accident is properly
considered the proximate cause of the fatality. Causal connection is established when
it is shown that the employee has received a compensable injury which materially
aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing latent disease which becomes the direct cause
of death.
158. 218 Va. 481, 237 S.E.2d 786 (1977).
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the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the in-
ternal weakness or disease to produce the disability is a question of
fact, not law. .... -15 Where the claimant can produce the neces-
sary evidence as to causation, recovery is allowed.160 Where a
claimant cannot establish the necessary relationship between em-
ployment and his condition, compensation is denied.161
A major exception to this doctrine exists where the claimant
misrepresents his pre-existing condition to the employer when the
employment relation is established. In a well-reasoned opinion,
where an employee had falsely stated on a job application that he
had no previous back problems, the Commission made its position
clear in holding:
Under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Law, the employer
takes the employee as he is and if the employee is suffering some
physical infirmity, which is aggravated by an industrial accident, the
employer is responsible for the end result of such accident. Under
such circumstances, there is compelling reason for the employer to
ascertain the physical condition of the prospective employee before
entering into the employment contract. If material misrepresenta-
tions as to his physical condition are made by the prospective em-
ployee to the prospective employer and employment is afforded on
159. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20, at 3-316.
160. The cases are numerous. For example, a claimant suffering from multiple sclerosis
was allowed compensation for a back injury he suffered while lifting a bag of groceries in
Bradshaw v. Giant Food, Inc., 57 O.I.C. 47 (1977). The medical evidence showed the claim-
ant to have pre-existing weakness affected by the industrial accident. In Cutler v. L.J. Hoy,
Inc., 57 O.I.C. 98 (1976), the employer filed an action to cease payment of benefits to an
employee whose continuing disability the employer claimed was due to a pre-existing ar-
thritic condition. The employee had originally been injured when he fell thirty feet and
landed on a hammer he was carrying in his pocket. The Commission held that- "It is clear
from the evidence that if the effects of this injury alone are not disabling, then they have
aggravated a pre-existing condition which now renders the claimant totally disabled." Id. at
99. Similarly, compensation was allowed a mechanic whose fall at work resulted in a rela-
tively minor trauma. The claimant was able to show that this minor injury caused the accel-
eration of a serious hip disease and resulted in surgery. Davis v. Glebe Auto Mkt., 55 O.I.C.
120 (1972).
161. Compensation was denied in Piver v, City of Norfolk/Botanical Gardens, 57 O.I.C.
293 (1976), because claimant's medical evidence was insufficient to show aggravation of the
pre-existing condition by a minor trauma sustained at work. See also Burger v. Emmett
Memorial Hosp., 55 O.I.C. 49 (1973) (compensation denied for torn cartilage in knee where
evidence showed the knee had been locking and giving way for some time previous to
accident).
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the basis of misrepresentations to the detriment of the employer it
is only right and just that compensation benefits be denied.162
This rule was applied in Alexander v. W. N. Jackson Co.,16 3 where
a claimant was denied recovery in part because he had denied hav-
ing any physical handicap or prior back problems on his applica-
tion for employment. In fact, the claimant was actually receiving
veteran's disability benefits for partial disability in his back and
one leg.
I. Employees Injured Through Idiopathic Falls
An idiopathic fall is one which is caused by some personal dis-
ease or weakness of the claimant. Although generally held to be
non-compensable, an injury caused by this type of fall can be com-
pensable if it is shown that the claimant's employment contributed
to the risk or aggravated the fall.164
In Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan,6 5 the claimant was injured while
en route to a doctor for follow-up care of a compensable injury. A
vascular condition caused him to black out while driving and an
accident resulted. Analogizing this situation to an idiopathic fall,
the court said: "An idiopathic fall injury generally is held compen-
sable where the employee's physical condition unites with some
hazard of his employment to cause the accident."116 6 The court held
that, because the claimant was under a statutory duty to accept
the medical treatment, 67 the hazards were combined with the
162. Hawkins v. Lane Co., 49 O.I.C. 144, 147 (1967).
163. 55 O.I.C. 1 (1973).
164. See Akers v. Virginia Maid Hosiery Mills, Inc., 57 O.I.C. 1 (1975); Ashby v. Rich-
mond Comm. Action Program, Inc., 52 O.I.C. 14 (1970).
165. 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967).
166. Id. at 726, 152 S.E.2d at 258.
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-88 (Repl. Vol 1980) provides:
As long as necessary after an accident the employer shall furnish or cause to be fur-
nished, free of charge to the injured employee, a physician chosen by the injured
employee from a panel of at least three physicians selected by the employer and such
other necessary medical attention, and where such accident results in the amputation
of an arm, hand, leg, or foot, or the enucleation of an eye, or the loss of any natural
teeth or loss of hearing, the employer shall furnish prosthetic appliances, proper
fitting thereof, and training in the use thereof, as the nature of the injury may
require, and the employee shall accept the attending physician, unless otherwise
ordered by the Industrial Commission, and in addition, such surgical and hospital
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claimant's pre-existing physical condition, "there was established a
causal connection between his employment and his additional in-
juries, and he was entitled to compensation.' 68
In Eggleston v. Madison Transfer Co.,"6 a laborer stacking lum-
ber on a dolly blacked out, striking his jaw on the edge of a piece
of lumber when he fell. In awarding compensation for the frac-
tured jaw, the Commission stated: "The applicable law is that floor
level idiopathic falls are not compensable .... But, where a condi-
tion of employment, such as the 2 x 4 which Eggleston struck caus-
ing a jaw injury, produces injury in an idiopathic fall, such injury is
itself compensable.' 17 0 These cases indicate that Virginia adheres
to the majority position in awarding compensation for injuries
caused by idiopathic falls, where "the employment places the em-
ployee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of such a fall,
such as on a height, near machinery or sharp corners, or in a mov-
ing vehicle.''
It is necessary to distinguish an idiopathic fall caused by a con-
dition personal to the claimant and an unexplained fall. Where the
cause of a fall is unexplained, resulting injury is compensable. For
service and supplies as may be deemed necessary by the attending physician or the
Industrial Commission.
The employer shall repair, if repairable, or replace dentures, artificial limbs or
other prosthetic devices damaged in an accident otherwise compensable under work-
men's compensation, and furnish proper fitting thereof.
The employer shall also furnish or cause to be furnished, at the direction of the
Industrial Commission, reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation training
services.
The unjustified refusal of the employee to accept such medical service or vocational
rehabilitation training when provided by the employer shall bar the employee from
further compensation until such refusal ceases and no compensation shall at any time
be paid for the period of suspension unless, in the opinion of the Industrial Commis-
sion, the circumstances justified the refusal. In any such case the Industrial Commis-
sion may order a change in the medical or hospital service or vocational rehabilitation
training.
If in an emergency or on account of the employer's failure to provide the medical
care during the period herein specified, or for other good reasons, a physician other
than provided by the employer is called to treat the injured employee, during said
period, the reasonable cost of such service shall be paid by the employer if ordered so
to do by the Industrial Commission.
168. 207 Va. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 259.
169. 53 O.I.C. 89 (1971).
170. Id. at 90.
171. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.11 (1978).
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example, in Akers v. Virginia Maid Hosiery Mills, Inc.,7 2 a fifty-
seven-year-old woman who fell face forward as she was walking
towards her employer's plant was compensated for her injuries.
There was no evidence as to the cause of the fall.73
J. Employees Injured in a Second Accident
If a claim is filed in a timely fashion, an injury due to a new and
separate accident is compensable under Virginia law if the second
accident is caused by a condition stemming from an earlier com-
pensable accident. In Reynolds v. Caton,74 the claimant suffered a
compensable knee injury. While he was recuperating at home, the
knee collapsed and he was injured further. The Commission held
the second injury to be compensable. In another case, a claimant
who had suffered a compensable knee injury climbed a cherry tree
at his home in order to hang some plates for the purpose of scaring
birds away. In the process, his injured knee gave way. To keep
from falling, he grabbed a branch and dislocated his shoulder. The
Commission determined that both the subsequent knee and shoul-
der injuries were the result of the original accident and awarded
compensation. 175 Similarly, compensation was awarded in a case
where the claimant's decedent died as the result of a fall caused by
the leg brace and crutches being used because of his primary in-
jury. The Commission held the employer liable for medical ex-
penses accrued in the treatment of the injury caused by the fall, as
well as for death benefits.78
As in other areas, a claimant's ability to recover for this type of
injury often turns on the strength of the evidence establishing cau-
sation between the primary injury and the subsequent injury. In
what appears to be a harsh decision, the Commission denied com-
pensation to a sixty-year-old woman in Jenkins v. Thalhimer
Brothers, Inc.,177 because the majority felt she had not met the
172. 57 O.LC. 1 (1975).
173. See also Ashby v. Richmond Comm. Action Program, Inc., 52 O.I.C. 14 (1970) (com-
pensation allowed when the claimant fell without explanation while she was acting as an
escort on a park walking tour).
174. 55 O.LC. 293 (1973).
175. Spratley v. Marlowe Tractor & Equip. Co., 54 O.I.C. 355 (1972).
176. Glenn & Bostic v. Goodman Bros., 52 O.LC. 110 (1970).
177. 57 O.I.C. 195 (1977).
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burden of showing her fall was caused by her primary injury. The
original injury was a broken hip which limited the use of the af-
fected leg to fifty percent of its prior capability. The claimant was
again injured while walking down a sidewalk when both her legs
gave way, causing her to fall. The attending physician testified that
he did not know why she fell but that it could have been caused by
the prior injury. The majority of the Commission held the medical
testimony to be no more than conjecture and denied compensation.
To summarize, a claimant must show that the second accident
was caused by an earlier compensable injury. It should be empha-
sized that the claimant does not have to show that the second acci-
dent was in the course of and arose out of the employment. "This
is so because the second injury is treated as if it occurred in the
course of and arising out of the employee's employment."178 When
dealing with a claim of this type, it is important to clearly distin-
guish between a "change in condition" and a "new and separate
accident." A "change in condition" is defined by statute as "a
change in physical condition of the employee, as well as any
change in the conditions under which compensation was awarded
or terminated which would affect the right to, amount of, or dura-
tion of compensation."179 With certain specified exceptions, the In-
dustrial Commission, on its own motion or th6 motion of a party in
interest, has twenty-four months within which to review an award
concerning an employee's change in condition.18 0 The time limit
begins to run from the last day compensation was paid under the
original award.
By contrast, a "new and separate accident" caused by the pri-
178. Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 214, 237 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1977).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-8 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-99 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides:
Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground
of a change in condition, the Industrial Commission may review any award and on
such review may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation
previously awarded, subject to the maximum or minimum provided in this Act, and
shall immediately send to the parties a copy of the award. No such review shall affect
such award as regards any moneys paid except pursuant to §§ 65.1-143, 65.1-144 and
65.1-151. No such review shall be made after twenty-four months from the last day
for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under this Act, except thirty-
six months from the last day for which compensation was paid shall be allowed for
the filing of claims payable under § 65.1-56.
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mary injury, although compensable, is one which does not"naturally flow from a progression, deterioration, or aggravation of
the injury sustained in the original industrial accident." 181 Com-
pensability of this type of injury is determined in an original hear-
ing. Since the injury is the result of a new and separate accident,
the employee must comply with provisions of the Act requiring
written notice to be given to the employer as soon after the acci-
dent as possible. 82 In any case, no compensation will be paid if
written notice is not given to the employer within thirty days of
the accident, unless the Industrial Commission is satisfied that the
claimant had a reasonable excuse for and the employer has not
been prejudiced by the delay. Furthermore, the claimant has
twenty-four months from the time of the accident (one year if
death results) to file a claim with the Industrial Commission. Fail-
ure to do so will bar the right to compensation.1 83
Another important distinction between a "change in condition"
and a "new accident" is that the filing provision governing changes
in condition is not jurisdictional and, thus, principles of waiver and
estoppel are applicable."" In marked contrast, the twenty-four
month filing provision governing new and separate accidents is ju-
risdictional, and if claimant fails to file within the time limit, his
claim will be barred.18 5
The importance of these procedural distinctions is demonstrated
181. Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 214, 237 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1977).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-85 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides:
Every injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the occurrence of
an accident or as soon thereafter as practicable give or cause to be given to the em-
ployer a written notice of the accident, and the employee shall not be entitled to
physician's fees nor to any compensation which may have accrued under the terms of
this Act prior to the giving of such notice, unless it can be shown that the employer,
his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident or that the party required
to give such notice had been prevented from doing so by reason of physical or mental
incapacity or the fraud or deceit of some third person. But no compensation shall be
payable unless such written notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence of
the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the
Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that
the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-87 (RepL Vol. 1980).
184. Binswanger Glass Co. v. Wallace, 214 Va. 70, 197 S.E.2d 191 (1973).
185. Barksdale v. H.O. Engen, Inc., 218 Va. 496, 237 S.E.2d 794 (1977).
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in the case of Leonard v. Arnold.18  There, the claimant received a
compensable injury which required him to wear a leg cast and use
crutches. He later injured his back when the crutches caused him
to fall on a restaurant stairway. The Industrial Commission found
the claimant's subsequent injury to be a change in condition and
held that the claim was timely filed. The Virginia Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the claimant had suffered a new and sepa-
rate accident. Thus, the claim was barred because the claimant
had failed to comply with the time limitations set forth in the Act.
K. Employees Whose Injuries Are Aggravated by Medical
Treatment
Under the Act, an employee must accept medical treatment of-
fered by his employer. 187 By statute, the employer must pay com-
186. 218 Va. 210, 237 S.E.2d 97 (1977).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-88 (Rep. Vol. 1980) (see note 167 supra for full text of the
statute). The refusal to accept medical treatment will bar the employee from receiving com-
pensation, unless the employee can show such refusal to be justified.
For example, refusal was deemed to be unjustified and the claimant's temporary award
was suspended in a case where his sole reason for refusing surgery for a compensable back
injury was that the surgeon could not guarantee a cure for the ailment. It was found that
without surgery the claimant would probably be disabled for life and that the surgery itself
was not inherently dangerous. Horn v. Centennial Constructors, Inc., 57 O.I.C. 171 (1976).
See also Joyner v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 54 O.I.C. 193 (1972) (refusal unjustified where
only reason for refusing surgery was that the claimant just did not want it); Boyd v. M & B
of Norfolk, Inc., 54 O.I.C. 28 (1972) (citing Stump v. Norfolk Shipbuilding Corp., 187 Va.
932, 48 S.E.2d 209 (1948)) (refusal unjustified where claimant refused surgery, failed to keep
several appointments, and discharged himself from hospital).
For cases where refusal of surgery was found to be justified, see Horn v. Buchanan-Dick-
enson Dev. Corp., 55 O.I.C. 178 (1973) (orthopedic surgeon felt injury had healed and that
surgery recommended by attending physician unnecessary); Thompson v. United Piece Dye
Works, 54 O.I.C. 379 (1972) (three major back operations had previously failed to correct
problem and a zero percent chance of total recovery existed, even if additional surgery per-
formed); Tharpe v. Virginia Baptist Home, Inc., 54 O.I.C. 372 (1972) (three doctors advised
against further surgery).
A failure to cooperate and follow doctor's instructions can be deemed to be a refusal of
medical treatment. In Ward v. Roses Stores, Inc., 51 O.I.C. 288, 289 (1969), the Commission
said: "From the record a finding is made that the claimant without justification refused
medical examination (i.e., did not fully cooperate) and also in effect refuses treatment (in
continuing her obese condition) that necessarily precludes effective treatment."
A claimant must voluntarily refuse treatment in order for it to be unjustified. The Com-
mission has awarded compensation to a claimant who was suffering from a compensable
psychiatric disorder, refused further treatment and checked himself out of the hospital. The
Commission reasoned:
The refusal of medical attention must be a voluntary action on the part of the claim-
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pensation for any aggravation of a compensable injury brought
about by that treatment although the employer is relieved of liabil-
ity in damages. The relevant section of the Act reads in part:
[T]he employer shall not be liable in damages for malpractice by a
physician or surgeon furnished by him pursuant to the provisions of
the preceding section (§ 65.1-88), but the consequences of any such
malpractice shall be deemed part of the injury resulting from the
accident and shall be compensated for as such. ",
The statute adopts what had been the common law position in
Virginia in cases where an injury is aggravated by medical
treatment.18 9
L. Employees Injured by Self-Inflicted Means
By statute, an injury or death which is caused by an employee's
willful misconduct or which is self-inflicted is explicitly noncom-
pensable.190 It appears from the opinions of the Industrial Coin-
ant. We cannot hold a claimant who is suffering from a job-related emotional or
mental disorder to the same standard to which a claimant not suffering from such a
disorder would be held. The very illness for which the claimant is being treated
removes, at least in part, the volition involved in refusing medical treatment.
Payne v. B & N Concrete Erectors, Inc., 55 O.I.C. 267, 268 (1973).
The Commission has, likewise, held that the failure to keep a medical appointment is not
unjustified when the claimant had not received notice of the appointment even though her
attorney had. Hall v. Highlands Nursing Home, Inc., 57 O.I.C. 153 (1976). See also McAdoo
v. Meadowbrook Country Club, 53 O.I.C. 175 (1971) (failure to keep appointment not unjus-
tified where claimant who lived alone went to stay with mother in New York while
recuperating).
The Virginia cases appear to agree with the position advanced by Professor Larson, al-
though he uses different language in articulating that position:
The question whether refusal of treatment should be a bar to compensation turns on
a determination whether the refusal is reasonable. Reasonableness in turn resolves
itself into a weighing of the probability of the treatment's successfully reducing the
disability by a significant amount, against the risk of the treatment to the claimant.
1 A. LARsON, supra note 2, § 13.22.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
189. See Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951). The statute does not, however,
relieve from tort liability any physician or other third party wrongdoer who aggravates the
injury.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-38 (Repl. VoL 1980) provides:
No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death:
(1) Due to the employee's willful misconduct, including intentional self-inflicted
injury,
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mission, however, that even in the absence of this specific statute a
self-inflicted injury or suicide would not be compensable under
other provisions of the Act."' In one case,19 2 an employee died in
the course of his employment by participating in and losing a game
of Russian Roulette. Although the employer relied on the specific
statutory provision as a defense to a resulting claim for compensa-
tion, the Commission stated: "It is our opinion that even without
this defense that this occurrence could not be held to have been an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment as de-
fined in § 65.1-7, Code of Virginia, and the many cases which are
annotated under this section. 1 93
A similar but much more complicated problem arises where a
compensable injury leads to a mental disorder in an employee who
subsequently commits suicide. "The basic legal question seems to
be agreed upon by almost all authorities: It is whether the act of
suicide was an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation
between the initial injury and the death. 19 4 In discussing the rules
under which a suicide may be compensable, Professor Larson
states:
Suicide under the majority rule is compensable if the injury pro-
duces mental derangement and the mental derangement produces
suicide. The minority rule is that suicide is not compensable unless
there has followed as the direct result of a work-connected injury an
insanity of such severity as to cause the victim to take his own life
(2) Growing out of his attempt to injure another,
(3) Due to intoxication, or
(4) Due to willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty re-
quired by statute or the willful breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the em-
ployer and approved by the Industrial Commission and brought prior to the accident
to the knowledge of the employee.
The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under
this section.
191. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980) which provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, "injury" and "personal injury" mean only in-
jury by accident, or occupational disease as hereinafter defined, arising out of and in
the course of the employment and do not include a disease in any form, except when
it results naturally and unavoidably from either of the foregoing causes.
192. Teller v. Campbell, 54 O.I.C. 370 (1972).
193. Id. at 371. See also Henley v. William King Elem. School, 50 O.LC. 184 (1968); Hen-
derson v. Basic Constr. Co., 47 O.I.C. 167 (1964).
194. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 36.10.
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through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without
conscious volition to produce death.195
M. Unexplained Deaths
When an employee is found dead in the course of his employ-
ment, and there is no evidence that the death arose out of the em-
ployment, the claimant's family and survivors would have an al-
most impossible task of proving a case for compensation but for
the presumption established in Sullivan v. Suffolk Peanut Co.:"'6
Where an employee is found dead as the result of an accident at his
place of work or near by, where his duties may have called him dur-
ing the hours of his work, and there is no evidence offered to show
what caused the death or to show that he was engaged in his
master's business at the time, the court will indulge the presumption
that the relation of master and servant existed at the time of the
accident, and that it arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
In Sullivan, a night watchman guarding the employer's premises
was struck by a train and killed while on nearby property at a
location affording a good vantage point from which to view his em-
ployer's plant. There were no witnesses and no other evidence link-
ing his death to his job, nor was there any evidence that he was on
a mission of his own. The Virginia Supreme Court, relying on sub-
stantial authority from other jurisdictions, applied the above pre-
sumption and awarded compensation.
As straightforward as the test for application of this presump-
tion appears, it has been a fertile source of litigation before both
the Virginia Supreme Court and the Industrial Commission. Ten
years after Sullivan, the court denied compensation to a claimant
by refusing to apply the presumption in Hopson v. Hungerford
Coal Co.19 7 In that case, the decedent was sent to cut corn on a
company-owned farm. While there, he was murdered by an escapee
from a nearby state hospital. After committing the murder, the es-
capee stole the company truck and hid it. The Industrial Commis-
195. Id. at § 36.00.
196. 171 Va. 439, 444, 199 S.E. 504, 506 (1938).
197. 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948).
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sion found there was insufficient proof as to the murderer's motive
and that it would be conjecture to conclude that it arose out of the
employment. There were two possible theories as to the motive for
murder. The first was that the mental patient wanted to steal the
company truck. The truck, however, was not in the field with the
decedent and could have been taken without resorting to murder.
The second possible theory was that the motive for murder was
unconnected to the employment. The Virginia Supreme Court held
that the choice between conflicting inferences is to be drawn by the
fact finder and refused to overturn the ruling of the Commission.
The court distinguished Sullivan on the grounds that, in Sullivan,
there was no evidence that the decedent was killed for a reason
unconnected with his employment.
In Southern Motor Lines v. Alvis, 198 decided ten years after
Hopson, the court applied the presumption in the case of a truck
driver found dead under a window outside the hotel where his em-
ployment required him to stay. Applying the Sullivan presump-
tion, the court relied on the absence of any evidence that the dece-
dent had committed suicide or had been on a mission of his own
when he fell from the window and awarded compensation.
The Commission also has applied the presumption in numerous
cases. In Glascock v. Nash Street Associates,19 the decedent was
found dead from head injuries received when his head struck the
pavement of his employer's driveway. The fall was unobserved and
there was no evidence of a personal weakness. Compensation was
awarded.
In what appears to be a conflicting decision with Glascock, the
Commission refused to apply the presumption in Burgess v. Cum-
mins Diesel, Inc 2 00 There, the decedent and another employee
were cutting brush when the fellow employee turned around to
find the decedent lying unconscious on the ground. The employee
died five days later of traumatic injury, but doctors were unable to
determine the cause of this injury. The Commission held that
before the presumption would arise the claimant had the burden of
198. 200 Va. 168, 104 S.E.2d 735 (1958).
199. 49 O.I.C. 132 (1967).
200. 52 O.I.C. 48 (1970).
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showing that the unwitnessed fall was the result of an accident. "In
the present case there is no evidence beyond the realm of surmise
and conjecture which supports the fact of accident."20 1
It may be possible to reconcile the two cases on the grounds that
the claimant in Glascock presented evidence that the decedent's
fall was not the result of a personal weakness, thereby indicating it
was the result of an accident. In Burgess, apparently no such evi-
dence was introduced.
The Commission again applied the presumption in a case where
a service station attendant was found shot to death on the em-
ployer's premises.20 2 A key taken from the body of the decedent
was found, along with other evidence, in back of the station. The
key was the only property taken. A suspect was subsequently ar-
rested and pled guilty to second degree murder. Disregarding the
suspect's statement of self-defense, the Commission held the evi-
dence supported an inference that the decedent was killed while
performing his duties.
Similarly, the presumption was applied in the case of a service
station attendant found shot to death shortly after the station
opened.203 Evidence showed that the decedent had been making
out a report prior to his death. The Commission thought it reason-
able to believe a customer may have scared off the assailant who
was never captured. In applying the presumption, the Commission
made note of evidence supplied by a state police investigator that
employment of this type exposed workers to a greater risk of rob-
bery than that facing the general public.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to
rule again on the strength and application of this presumption in
Baggett Transportation Co. v. Dillon,20' where the presumption
apparently came into conflict with the court's adherence to what it
terms the "actual risk" test.20 5 In Baggett, as discussed earlier in
section C, a truck driver was found dead next to his employer's
201. Id. at 51.
202. Jenkins v. Houser, 54 O.LC. 185 (1972).
203. Rasnake v. Kayo Oil Co., 57 O.I.C. 298 (1976).
204. 219 Va. 633, 248 S.E.2d 819 (1978).
205. Id. See the preceding discussion of Baggett, note 118 supra and accompanying text.
See also the preceding discussion of actual risk test, note 111 supra and accompanying text.
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truck by his co-driver who had been asleep in the cab of the truck.
The cause of death was a chest wound caused by a .22 caliber bul-
let. The truck had been parked near the exit ramp of a temporarily
closed rest area on an interstate highway. Evidence indicated that
the driver may have been in the process of adding motor oil to the
truck's engine. There was no evidence of attempted robbery or hi-
jacking, and there was evidence indicating that two other shootings
had occurred in the vicinity of the rest area prior to this incident.
The court held that, while the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish that the decedent was in the course of his employment, the
death did not arise out of the employment. In so holding, the court
relied heavily on its holding in Hopson. 6 In both cases, the court
seems to have placed great weight on the presence of evidence pos-
sibly indicating that the cause of death was unrelated to the dece-
dent's employment. The court stated:
The same reason which prompted the court to hold the presumption
was inapplicable in Hopson motivates us to decide that it is inap-
propriate here. In the present case, there is not an absence of con-
trary or conflicting evidence bearing on the question of causation.
Here, inferences can be logically drawn from the circumstances that
tend to support the conclusion that there was no causal connection
between the death and the employment. 207
For like reasons, the court distinguished Alvis: 208
[Tihe circumstances forming the basis of the presumption in Alvis
were of sufficient strength from which the only rational inference to
be drawn was that death arose out of the employment. There, the
lack of evidence dictated employment of the presumption. But here
the presence of evidence prevents use of the presumption.209
Thus, the Baggett case indicates that any evidence of a cause
unrelated to employment may be sufficient to remove the case
from the category where the presumption applies. Given the very
206. 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948).
207. 219 Va. at 643, 248 S.E.2d at 825.
208. 200 Va. 168, 104 S.E.2d 735 (1958).
209. 219 Va. at 644, 248 S.E.2d at 826.
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broad rules enacted by the Commission concerning admissibility of
evidence,210 even remote evidence such as a report of a shooting
five years earlier may be sufficient to undercut application of the
presumption.
V. CONCLUSION
The field of workmen's compensation law, with a vocabulary in-
cluding the terms "statutory employer" and "actual risk" test, ap-
pears at first glance to be a specialty unto itself and a world set
apart from traditional common law principles. While this area of
the law does differ significantly from traditional tort concepts in its
indifference to fault and negligence, it is not as alien as it might
first appear. Workmen's compensation law draws upon many tradi-
tional common law areas for its analysis. For example, in determin-
ing employer status, traditional concepts of agency law control.
Similarly, proof of causation, important in any negligence action, is
equally important in a workmen's compensation proceeding.
Because workmen's compensation is generally the exclusive rem-
edy for any work-connected injury, even where such injury is
caused by a negligent employer or negligent fellow employee, the
importance of its relationship to tort law cannot be overempha-
sized. Further, recoveries for claimants injured in work-related ac-
cidents can easily amount to thousands of dollars, and the prompt
availability of paid medical care may be invaluable to an injured
employee. For these reasons, we submit that the field is worthy of
the continued interest and attention of all lawyers.
210. Rule 1, Rules of the Industrial Commission, provides:
A hearing held by the full Commission, a Commissioner, or Deputy Commissioner
shall be conducted as a judicial proceeding in that all witnesses shall testify under
oath, and a record of the proceedings shall be made. The Commission will not be
bound by statutory or common law rules of pleading or evidence, nor by any technical
rules of practice in conducting hearings, but will conduct such hearings and make
such investigations in reference to the questions at issue in such manner as in its
judgment are held adapted to ascertain and determine expeditiously and accurately
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Work-
men's Compensation Act; and to that end, hearsay evidence may be received.
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